Crossing Thresholds

Introduction

The most important rule: go unnoticed. You need to blend into the crowd. Dress inconspicuously; don’t swear; walk on the inside of the pavement; prepare an alibi; use public transport during rush hour; be punctual — if someone is two minutes late to meet you, they may have been captured.

This is the basic code of conduct for Ukrainian underground fighters, as set out by the National Resistance Center of Ukraine — the Ukrainian government’s online resource to support the patriotic resistance under Russian occupation. This partisan movement comprises many thousands of Ukrainians and covers all manner of activities, from distributing yellow ribbons to assassinating Russian secret policemen. Their stories are as harrowing as they are heroic. For instance, in occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Region, Maksym Makhrinov’s final breath was an explosive statement of resistance. Confronted by Russian forces who had uncovered his partisan work for the Ukrainian Armed Forces, Makhrinov blew himself up, taking two Russian soldiers with him. But what led Makhrinov to this situation?

The following report is an effort to provide indicative answers to this question. It is based on extensive fieldwork in Ukraine since 2022, largely in the de-occupied territories. It includes 63 interviews, 50 of which are with people who had been under occupation, 17 with individuals involved in violent or nonviolent resistance, and 7 with officials in the security services responsible for handling and helping ongoing resistance. As such, the report makes no claims to be representative; it does, however, also draw from a literature review of relevant sources, such as Ukrainian Telegram channels of resistance networks and offers of support; Ukrainian reports on this topic from organizations such as OPORA, Prometheus, Eastern Variant, Eastern Human Rights Group, and the National Resistance Center; and interviews with experts specializing in this field. For the purposes of safety and anonymization, the names of most interviewees have been changed and locations are kept deliberately vague.

The purpose of this report is to provide insights into the importance of the resistance, its impact on the sustainability of Russia’s war and occupation, the reality of conducting resistance, and the personal stories of some of those involved. Resistance here is defined as any act that deliberately challenges or impedes the Russian war aim as defined by Vladimir Putin: to destroy Ukrainian sovereignty and identity. Amid ongoing discussions of negotiations and dwindling resilience in the West to support Ukraine, the report will also provide information about the reality of Russia’s occupation and Ukrainians’ struggle against it. If Western policymakers intend to abandon Ukraine to its fate, they have a responsibility to acknowledge what that fate entails.

Alternatively, if Western support for Ukraine does prove more resilient, this report provides recommendations and insights into how the resistance can support the Ukrainian war effort, as well as ways to aid the resistance — from boosting morale to providing material assistance. As the involvement of civilian efforts across the West to support Ukraine has been considerable, a number of recommendations are also aimed more generally at interested organizations and individuals who would like to support, morally or otherwise, the Ukrainian resistance against the Russian occupation.

Occupied Territories

The Situation on the Ground

To appropriately contextualize the impact, tenor, and ramifications of Ukrainian resistance against Russian occupation, a foundational understanding of the prevailing conditions is essential. Investigations into the situation within these territories highlight egregious human rights abuses perpetrated by the Russian Federation — the abduction of children, torture, extrajudicial killings, indoctrination, pervasive homelessness and poverty, and systematic resource extraction.

Concurrently, the Russian Ministry of Defense has invested in building new military infrastructure in occupied regions. This militarization extends beyond the presence of military installations; it involves a comprehensive reorientation of local industries to support military logistics, the construction of essential supply networks, and educational reforms designed to instill a pro-military ethos among residents. This strategy aims to transform the occupied territories into a militarized zone, acting as a buffer and demarcation line that underscores the Russian government’s intentions toward the remaining unoccupied Ukrainian territories.

The development of civilian infrastructure in the occupied Ukrainian territories is conspicuously absent, as evidenced by the lack of reconstruction efforts in devastated cities such as Popasna, Volnovakha, Bakhmut, and Soledar. Forced mobilization of locals, exploitation of natural resources, and neglect of civil infrastructure development have precipitated a humanitarian crisis. In June 2023, the Russian government’s allocation of 2.9 billion rubles — significantly less than the planned 3.7 billion rubles — for industrial development in these territories reflects Russia’s reduced commitment to reviving local industries, further exacerbating the unsustainable nature of its occupation model.

Socially, interviewees report that the occupation has fractured community bonds, increased substance abuse, and fueled desires for vengeance against collaborators and Russian forces. The emergence of new social hierarchies, such as the privileged status of (some) collaborators and the disintegration of prewar moral and social orders, poses significant threats to the long-term cohesion of these communities. The demographic situation is critical. In the temporarily occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, the healthcare system has deteriorated significantly due to the departure of medical professionals; occupation administration statistics indicate that 1 in every 81 newborns dies. From 2018 to 2022, the birth rate in the so-called Donetsk People’s Republic decreased by 46.8 percent.

The Russian occupiers have exacerbated the current demographic decline through policies that include the shutdown of industrial enterprises and the degradation of healthcare services. In many places, the lack of workers has rendered it impossible to sustain essential services, such as water supply and infrastructure repair; this has prompted directives from the Kremlin to recruit Russian citizens and migrant workers to populate the occupied regions, an approach that is also part of a broader movement of settler colonialism and ethnic cleansing in the occupied territories.

The strategies deployed in the occupied territories demonstrate a profound disregard for the wellbeing of the local population, particularly Ukrainians. This includes the conscription of locals into so-called forward detachments, effectively using them as human shields. Those captured are subsequently abandoned and relegated to second-class status — as demonstrated by a recent video appeal to Putin from POWs from the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics (DNR/LNR) who are upset they are being excluded from prisoner swaps, with only “proper” Russians being exchanged. Aside from a few lucky collaborators, the only individuals leading normal lives in the occupied territories are Russian nationals who have relocated to these “new territories.” Interviewees comprising former and current residents of the occupied territories report that any semblance of normality is largely a facade, masking ongoing human rights abuses such as disappearances and torture.

The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports. The enforcement of Russian passport acquisition renders daily life and access to essential services contingent upon compliance with the occupiers’ demands, serving as an indirect punishment for those resisting the imposition of a Russian identity. For instance, emergency services and property transactions are inaccessible without a Russian passport; an interviewed individual recounted an unsuccessful attempt to reclaim her property near Donetsk due to her refusal to accept a Russian passport. Workers’ wages may also be withheld if they refuse to take a passport.

The selective imposition of normality has led to a system that resembles apartheid between Russian and Ukrainian citizens, heavily enforced by the mandatory acquisition of Russian passports.

Moreover, Russia’s strategy has extended to the systemic restructuring of local governance; as a rule, only Russian citizens who have not previously worked in Ukraine are appointed to senior law enforcement positions within the occupied territories. This policy underscores the Kremlin’s intent to sever any preexisting local ties to Ukrainian governance and assert control, albeit at arms’ length. The Ukrainian Cyber Resistance recently acquired the messages of the deputy director of the Russian Federal Penitentiary Service, in which it was revealed that he refuses to communicate directly with subordinates in the occupied territories of Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia regions. Instead, he orders the heads of the department in the Rostov region and Crimea to work as intermediaries, underscoring a hierarchical enforcement structure.

Despite these measures, the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation permitted residents of the occupied territories to vote in 2023 using any form of identification, including Ukrainian passports. This policy was part of a broader strategy to compile comprehensive voter lists, indirectly serving as a population census, with data subsequently integrated into Russian federal systems. The demographic shifts in these regions are stark; in Melitopol alone, the population halved post-invasion — somewhat offset by the nearly 100,000 Russian nationals relocating to the city, further illustrating a deliberate strategy of ethnic cleansing and demographic manipulation by Russian authorities. Such strategies are coupled with severe restrictions on communication and mobility, particularly in areas near the front line, contributing to a climate of intense surveillance and suppression of dissent. This oppressive environment has eroded community bonds and trust, with residents living under constant fear of betrayal or coercion, reminiscent of Soviet-era tactics.

A rigorous system for monitoring and quelling dissent has been progressively intensified. Measures include eavesdropping on communications, the widespread installation of surveillance cameras, and the establishment of an informant network within communities. Access to external information sources is significantly constrained in the temporarily occupied territories, particularly in areas close to the front line, such as Lysychansk, Sievierodonetsk, Rubizhne, and Kreminna. These cities experience substantial disruptions in internet and mobile communication services, which are restricted by occupation authorities due to concerns that local residents might transmit sensitive information to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The atmosphere of control extends to acts of intimidation and harassment, which the occupying forces perpetrate with apparent impunity. For instance, social media platforms like Telegram reveal frequent discussions among residents of occupied Mariupol and Luhansk about vehicular accidents caused by inebriated or reckless Russian soldiers. A particularly distressing incident occurred in Luhansk, where a Russian tank ran over a woman at a pedestrian crossing in broad daylight, eliciting no public reaction — a stark indicator of the societal desensitization that has occurred under prolonged Russian occupation. Such everyday harassment is particularly targeted at young and attractive women: as one interviewee noted, “All of the girls stopped taking care of themselves, the women go around in ugly clothes, it didn’t used to be like that, women had their hair, their nails (done).” When asked whether this was due to the economic situation, the interlocutor explained that it was in order to not draw the attention of occupiers, “especially the Chechens.”

There have been numerous reported cases of Russian forces, including but far from limited to Chechens, sexually assaulting and raping women. A veteran soldier, actively involved in the de-occupied territories, recounted harrowing accounts of elderly women in villages who had suffered sexual assault. He told stories of wives being raped before their husbands, who were then killed after being forced to witness the crime, and of young attractive women being kidnapped as sex slaves for senior Russian officers. During interviews with villagers who had lived under occupation in the Kharkiv region, the majority of the worst cases, including the gang rape of an elderly woman in a village not far from the border with Donetsk region, happened during the initial invasion. However, rape and sexual violence — primarily toward women but also toward men in Russian custody — are a systematic part of the occupation and of the general feeling of impunity that the occupying soldiers enjoy or, as this report will show, presume they can enjoy.

The Ukrainian Resistance at a Glance

Given the escalating atrocities associated with Russia’s unpredictable and intensifying occupation, it is understandable that a considerable number of individuals might be compelled to resist, despite the profound risks associated with such actions. The context of the occupation — marked by its brutality and the existential threat it poses to Ukrainian identity and autonomy — naturally fosters various forms of resistance. Four distinct types of resistance emerge through research:

Private Resistance: This form involves actions that are personal and confined to a close circle of trusted individuals. Examples include reading Ukrainian literature, speaking Ukrainian within the household, sending children to the neighbors so they are seen to be leaving home for school but do not actually attend school, and refusing to take a Russian passport.

Public Nonlethal Resistance: These activities are overt but nonviolent, aimed at bolstering community morale and asserting Ukrainian presence. They include posting flyers, displaying Ukrainian symbols in public spaces, participating in memorial acts like placing candles in windows to commemorate the Holodomor, and engaging in symbolic resistance such as the Yellow Ribbon and Zla Mavka movements.

Internal Lethal Resistance: This category involves direct contributions to military efforts, such as transmitting coordinates of Russian forces to Ukrainian Special Operations Forces and monitoring the movements of Russian soldiers to facilitate targeted actions.

Public Lethal Resistance: The most overt and dangerous form, this type of resistance includes acts such as assassinating Russian occupation personnel and their collaborators and sabotaging occupation infrastructure, as seen in operations by groups like ATESH and SROK.

The primary focus of this paper will be on the lethal forms of resistance. These actions, though less frequently discussed and more challenging to document, play a critical role in the broader resistance movement. However, the study will also address nonlethal resistance, highlighting its significance in sustaining public spirit, fostering a sense of community, and boosting the morale of those engaged in direct combat, as well as the Ukrainian Armed Forces committed to liberating their territory. This analysis aims to understand the diverse profiles of individuals who participate in both lethal and nonlethal resistance, exploring their motivations, the risks they face, and the impact of their actions on the occupation dynamics.

DEMOGRAPHICS

The resistance movement in Ukraine’s occupied territories comprises a diverse demographic, although it predominantly involves younger participants. This younger cohort’s engagement is often attributed to a combination of factors: greater physical capability, a sense of invincibility, and, importantly, a stronger national identity coupled with less nostalgia for the Soviet Union era, as indicated by opinion polls. While men are more commonly engaged in active violent resistance, women play substantial roles in both nonviolent and violent actions. For instance, in the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol, over a hundred women participate in direct actions, though the network extends far beyond this number. The movement has seen significant growth, particularly during the winter months when new members from Luhansk and Donetsk began to emerge, despite previous isolation.

A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly. Women have also been instrumental in more covert forms of resistance — such as poisoning the food and drink offered to Russian soldiers, exploiting the occupiers’ presumptions of local hospitality. In an interview with the author, one ATESH commander explained the varied makeup of their resistance movement:

There are a lot of people and everyone is different but I will try to generalize as objectively as possible. We have men and women among our agents. Most of them are under 40. The majority of them are married but far from all of them have children. There are very few people in our movement who originally sympathized with Russia. Those few who did change their minds are not involved in sabotage operations but they do help with all sorts of information. On the other hand, we have a different situation with agents located in the Russian Federation. February 2022 changed the worldview of a lot of people. Such a large-scale war and the Putin regime’s crimes forced Russians to cooperate with the ATESH movement.

The socioeconomic profile of the resistance is primarily composed of middle and lower-class individuals. Many of the wealthiest Ukrainians fled the country early in the full-scale invasion, having the resources to do so. In contrast, those from less affluent backgrounds — including some of the most marginalized groups, such as prisoners — have contributed significantly to the resistance efforts. For example, detainees in the Kherson pretrial detention center managed to transmit coordinates of enemy missiles and machinery using a covertly held phone, enabling precise Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes on Russian command centers.

A notable aspect of the resistance is the participation from Crimea, an area previously thought to be subdued after years of occupation. Reports indicate that a large number of women from Crimea have joined the resistance, demonstrating a readiness to oppose the occupation robustly.

This demographic diversity within the resistance highlights a widespread national commitment across different strata of society, challenging the occupation through various forms of resistance that leverage the unique capabilities and circumstances of its members.

LANGUAGE, LOCATION, AND CULTURAL IDENTITY

Many resistance movements operate in Russian-speaking areas but conduct their activities in Ukrainian, as there is a lower likelihood of occupiers understanding the language. The use of the Ukrainian language in resistance activities, especially those involving information dissemination and education, also serves as a tool of cultural resistance and identity affirmation.

It is worth noting, however, that despite language differences, there is no significant division between Russian-speaking and Ukrainian-speaking individuals in terms of their opposition to the occupiers. Linguistic preference does not correlate with political allegiance; just as speaking English does not imply that an Irishman supports British reinvasion, speaking Russian does not mean a Ukrainian desires Russian occupation. In Kharkiv, for example, predominantly Russian-speaking defenders initially confronted the Russian “liberators” with significant resistance. Notably, the Azov Assault Brigade and the Kraken Special Division, units particularly reviled by the Kremlin, consist overwhelmingly of Russian speakers.

Furthermore, the assumption that residents in territories that were occupied following the 2014 invasion are less resistant than those in other cities does not always hold. For instance, Alchevsk in the Luhansk region, occupied by Russian forces in 2014, has experienced persistent hardships under occupation — including frequent water shortages, unstable mobile communications, and inadequate postal services — all of which have contributed to profound anger with the occupation. In an interview with the Eastern Variant network, a local Ukrainian partisan from Alchevsk conveyed the communal exhaustion with the ongoing deprivation and highlighted significant local resistance actions, such as the sabotage of enemy locations and ammunition depots:

Of course, the main problem in Alchevsk is water supply. It often happens that one of the areas does not have water for four to five days. Discussions arise almost weekly: either a water pipe has burst, the sewage smells across the street, or there has been no water for four days. Besides, the city often has very poor connectivity. Mobile internet was only allowed after the new year. . . . Even local Russian patriots realize that the occupiers have taken 10 years of their lives while not doing anything significant or centralized. Has life gotten better? Not at all. People have lost time, and that’s the most important thing. The occupiers closely monitor Alchevsk. Russians do not trust the local authorities entirely and always keep them under control, placing people from Russia. There are still people with a pro-Ukrainian stance in the city, especially noticeable in 2022 when almost all enemy locations and ammunition depots in Alchevsk were blown up, thanks to local partisans. Alchevsk is Ukraine. Alchevsk is waiting to return home.

Occupational challenges have persisted in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions since 2014, with the situation worsening after the full-scale invasion in 2022. From the very start, there has been forced mobilization, and local LNR and DNR forces receive inferior treatment compared to Russian soldiers. Further, the dissatisfaction among the collaborator ruling class with the Kremlin’s personnel policies has led to instances of noncompliance and outright sabotage, as evidenced in Horlivka, where new mobilization rounds were refused.

The author’s interviews with those living or having lived under LNR and DNR occupation often revealed conflicts between local “People’s Militia” units and Russian forces, driven by deep-seated differences. The cancellation of LPR and DPR passports, replaced with Russian passports, restricted residents’ ability to cross into Ukrainian-controlled territory, exacerbating tensions. Furthermore, the continuous arrests and detentions of pro-Ukrainian locals have intensified animosity toward Russian law enforcement representatives among the detainees’ families. To consolidate control, the Kremlin has significantly strengthened its law enforcement presence in the occupied territories, establishing an extensive network of Russian military and security forces, especially the National Guard and FSB (Russia’s domestic intelligence agency) counterintelligence.

MOTIVATIONS AND BACKGROUND

From interviews with past and current members of the resistance, as well as potential recruits, it is evident that these individuals are characterized by resourcefulness, courage, and resilience. Often creative and slightly anarchic, they tend not to adhere strictly to directives, even when associated with intelligence agencies. The challenging circumstances of ongoing resistance have further honed their ingenuity, compelling them to become highly adaptive and continuously develop new tactics to persist in their activities under intense surveillance and oppression.

The resistance members who engaged with the author expressed a spectrum of political beliefs, ranging from left-wing to right-wing ideologies. However, a common thread among them was a robust commitment to sovereignty and freedom, which they interpreted in practical rather than abstract terms. Motivated by a sense of basic human dignity, they articulated sentiments such as: “I refuse to live like a serf in my own home[town/land]” and “This is my country; why should I just hand it over to [Russians]?” In this context, concepts like sovereignty and freedom are understood literally — as the right not to be dragged into a basement and tortured, or the right to not have someone take your apartment.

The motivations of resistance members vary, often depending on the nature of their involvement. Those engaged in violent acts of resistance, such as sabotage and assassination, are typically the most patriotic and ideologically driven. These individuals often chose to stay behind in occupied areas to fight. For instance, one Ukrainian serviceman interviewed for this report shared how he was instructed in late 2021 to remain and coordinate resistance activities in the event of occupation. He and his colleagues replicated training schools for resistance under occupation, drawing on both local knowledge and external support — sometimes from Western intelligence agencies, though the applicability of the latter’s methods received mixed reviews from interviewees.

For these “anticipatory” resisters, who are often linked formally or informally with Ukrainian Military Intelligence (HUR), their motivations are deeply entwined with a sense of historical destiny. Common sentiments among these fighters include a determination to end centuries-long struggles against Russian domination, referencing historical atrocities and genocides, such as the Holodomor, as well as Russian efforts to erase Ukrainian identity. These sentiments are prevalent across much of the Ukrainian resistance, with many viewing the conflict as a genocidal attempt to destroy the Ukrainian nation. The millennial generation, in particular, expresses frustration with their parents’ generation for not doing more to secure Ukraine’s defense post–Soviet Union. This historical perspective is also prominent in Ukrainian media coverage of the resistance, reinforcing the narrative of finality and self-defense: fighting now so future generations won’t have to. This is exemplified by initiatives like HUR’s Military TV Resistance Movement project launched on June 2, 2022, which featured a series of informational films to educate and motivate citizens to defend their lives and homeland.

The resistance includes many trained professionals, such as the types of operatives who planned to stay behind — the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces, military intelligence, and certain special divisions. For example, the Kraken special division has been known to operate in Russian-controlled territories with considerable success, although it also sometimes sees losses. However, there are also many in the resistance who were not initially prepared for such roles but found themselves compelled by circumstances. For instance, the Sumy volunteer group, or “SUD,” was composed largely of local volunteers and yet they played a critical role in defending their city when official military presence was scant. This group, which grew to about 900 people, was pivotal in organizing local defense and maintaining order during the initial stages of the invasion. People continue to join the resistance, largely operating in small cells with minimal connection to other members. As one ATESH fighter explained:

People get in touch with us by contacting one of the coordinators of our Telegram channel. Or via personal contacts. The coordination of agents is generally carried out over secure messaging apps or some other different channel, depending on the situation.

Among those who are not professionals or trained operatives, the motivations for joining the resistance are complex and varied. For some, it might be a response to direct impacts of the occupation, such as loss of property, restrictions on freedoms, or personal harm. The “sister regions” program implemented by Russia, which sees a Russian region invest in an occupied area and then receive rights to flood markets with local products, is one example that fueled resentment and resistance. By displacing local goods with more expensive Russian products, this program not only altered the economic landscape but also deepened the sense that this was an occupation purely in the interests of the occupiers.

Sexual violence and other forms of abuse by Russian forces also serve as potent motivators for resistance. The horrific acts committed against both men and women have galvanized many to take up arms or support the resistance in any way they can. The fear and indignity experienced by victims and witnesses have in many cases been translated into a fierce determination to resist. This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.

This complex amalgam of historical grievances, personal experiences of injustice and abuse, and a profound commitment to national sovereignty and cultural preservation are fueling a resilient and adaptive movement determined to oppose Russian occupation and influence.

Forms of Resistance

In wars like Ukraine’s fight for sovereignty, the distinctions between soldiers, civilians, and resistance fighters often become indistinct, as a broad segment of the population engages in the struggle for national survival. As previously discussed, the separation between violent and nonviolent resistance is somewhat artificial, given that each type supports and sustains the other, creating a symbiotic relationship of mutual reliance. In the words of one ATESH commander, speaking to the author:

Non-violent resistance is incredibly important too. We also conduct forms of non-violent resistance, like agitational events in Russian and occupied Ukrainian cities. Our “ATESH civilian strength” activists put up our flyers across cities and this demonstrates our presence among the population. People feel a sense of support, that people who think like them are living next door. We also take revenge on drivers who support Russia’s criminal war. We destroy or paint over cars with ZOV symbols.

However, it is important to note that some members of the resistance consciously choose to avoid involvement in violent or lethal actions, driven either by personal convictions or a strategic desire to preserve their lives. To understand the full scope of the resistance, it is crucial to delineate and examine the specific acts that contribute to the broader resistance movement. Such an analysis not only highlights the varied nature of resistance activities but also helps in understanding the dynamic interplay between different forms of resistance and their collective impact on Ukraine’s struggle for autonomy.

Nonviolent Resistance

PUBLIC ACTS OF DEFIANCE

These include acts of civil disobedience, such as refusing to comply with the occupiers’ demands or participating in organized protests and demonstrations to challenge the authority and legitimacy of the occupying forces. For example, the Zla Mavka group based in Melitopol has created and distributed fake rubles with Ukrainian symbols and messages to remind the occupiers that they are in Ukraine, not Russia. This initiative represents a creative form of psychological resistance, using humor and art to assert Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. Another prominent example is the Yellow Ribbon movement, which involves Ukrainian citizens discreetly displaying yellow ribbons as a sign of solidarity and covert defiance against Russian forces. The choice of yellow, along with blue, represents the colors of the Ukrainian national flag, signaling a quiet yet powerful affirmation of national identity and opposition to the occupiers.

This form of resistance is significant because it allows for broad participation from the public, including those who may not be able to engage in more direct or violent forms of resistance. By adopting such symbols, individuals communicate their support for Ukraine’s sovereignty and their resistance to the occupation in a manner that is relatively safe yet impactful. This method is particularly effective in fostering a sense of unity and shared purpose among the population, reinforcing the resilience of the community in the face of foreign aggression.

INFORMATION AND CULTURAL INITIATIVES

To counter the occupiers’ narrative and propaganda, the resistance works hard to disseminate accurate information about the situation in the occupied territories. For instance, online bots like Resistance.Bot enable reporting on repairs to communication lines, allowing the Ukrainian underground to prevent occupiers from restricting internet access. For younger inhabitants of the occupied territories, the use of the internet and social media — especially Telegram — plays a crucial role in organizing, communicating, and raising awareness about the occupation, thus enabling the spread of information, mobilization of support, and coordination of activities without the need for direct confrontation. Telegram and increasingly Signal are also the way that violent resistance groups recruit new members.

Other efforts encompass activities by journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens aimed at documenting abuses, reporting on the actual conditions under occupation, and debunking falsehoods spread by the occupiers. This includes the production and distribution of materials, such as newspapers and leaflets, with pro-Ukrainian content to combat occupier narratives and bolster public morale. The production of physical products is especially important given that the occupation forces primarily target their propaganda at older demographics, for whom the main source of information is television.

YOUTH INDOCTRINATION

Engaging in cultural and educational activities that promote Ukrainian identity and resist Russian cultural assimilation represents another facet of nonviolent resistance. This may include organizing Ukrainian language classes, cultural events, and discussions that reinforce the community’s identity and resilience against efforts to suppress it. For this report, the author spoke to several university professors in free Ukraine who provide online classes to students of high school and university age who are located in the occupied territories. These classes are discreet, with students joining anonymously using false names and with their cameras off to ensure their safety. However, the students often join group classes and are reluctant to take up the offer of separate classes, away from their fellow students, as to them maintaining their connection to a broader Ukrainian community is a much-needed “form of psychological sustenance under the oppressive conditions of occupation.”

A recent BBC report highlighted a schoolteacher who left occupied Melitopol but continues to teach her former students who were left behind. In her case, she prioritizes psychological support and cultural education over traditional subjects, recognizing the significant emotional and psychological impact of the occupation on the children. In the occupied territories themselves, the author was told of numerous efforts to create safe spaces for Ukrainian education — from language to literature — for the children. Originally this was possible under the guise of religious or other forms of gatherings, but since the pseudo-referenda in autumn 2022, this has become much more difficult. The risks associated with these educational efforts are substantial, as any sign of dissent can lead to severe repercussions, including potential forced conscription of the students’ parents into the Russian military. However, these initiatives are critical in countering Russian propaganda and Russia’s extensive cultural and educational indoctrination efforts. By keeping children and older students connected to their Ukrainian roots and realities, these teachers and professors maintain a sense of identity and resilience.

LEGAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE

Other efforts involve resisting through legal and administrative means, such as refusing to recognize the legality of the occupiers’ authorities, not participating in their organized events or elections, and maintaining loyalty to the Ukrainian government. This type of resistance challenges the occupiers’ attempts to legitimize their control and governance over the occupied territories. Despite the efforts at forced passportization, a large number of Ukrainians have resisted, with the National Resistance Centre, using Russian state statistics, claiming that at least 60 percent of Ukrainians have refused passports and 80 percent have refused to put Russian license plates on their cars, as required by law. One interviewee from an area occupied since 2014 who is unable to leave due to caring responsibilities explained to the author: “I won’t take a Russian passport. [My friends in Ukraine] tell me I should, that it is safer but if I do, then who will be here to greet our boys when they liberate us? Where will all the Ukrainians be? I will greet [our boys] as a Ukrainian.”

Violent Resistance

Types of violent resistance in the occupied territories include direct attacks and sabotage operations against Russian forces and infrastructure, as well as coordinated efforts with Ukrainian Armed Forces for targeted assaults on enemy positions.

RECONNAISSANCE

In addition to educating the public on the situation, countering misinformation, and maintaining morale among the Ukrainian population, various digital platforms have been crucial for coordinating immediate resistance activities. For example, during the occupation of the Kharkiv region, local civilian defense forces, in cooperation with intelligence agencies, established a Signal chat across the region that allowed them to track the movements of the occupiers, often via hastily taken photos from the windows of basements in occupied villages. The chat was set up within the first day of the invasion. This was thanks to the Ukrainian history of self-organization and a certain level of social trust, as well as preparation. The mayor of Derhachi spoke to the author of his own involvement in clandestine networks that enabled the liberation of his home village, Ruska Lozova, strategically placed on the Kharkiv-Belgorod highway. The mayor’s broad network of friends and family provided information on the movements of Russians.

On one occasion, the sharing of encrypted information over social networks and chats led to civilians informing the armed forces that a nearby factory had been taken by the Russians and was being used by them to store military equipment and tanks. Once this information had been verified, the choice was taken by intelligence forces to destroy this site. As the Russians were holding Ukrainian civilians as human shields, this was an especially fraught choice for those involved; however, the risk to the general population of Ukraine’s second-largest city meant that it was a choice the intelligence operative involved felt he had to take.

The longer the occupation continued, however, the less useful such chats became. For example, by August the Kharkiv region chat was largely dead, as the risks became too high with the enhanced occupation regime. Thankfully for the residents of the Kharkiv region, their liberation came soon after. However, the challenges of disseminating information have not halted resistance efforts. Resistance groups such as ATESH continue to provide intelligence on air defenses, depots, military bases, and soldiers’ movements. Journalists have also played a crucial role; for instance, journalists from the online news source Eastern Variant established a hotline for residents of occupied and frontline territories. This provided a secure channel for information sharing, seeking assistance, and accessing a network of specialists. Eastern Variant also launched an online school of civic journalism to teach non-journalists how to safely transmit information, expanding the impact of grassroots information efforts.

Support is not unidirectional; for instance, the “In the Eyes of Partisans” fundraiser, initiated by the Center for National Resistance in 2023, helped purchase drones used to adjust attacks on Russian forces. The resistance’s logistical challenges include acquiring and distributing inexpensive but effective smartphones for communication and coordination, with many such efforts described as grassroots initiatives relying on a network of trusted contacts. There are numerous organizations to support the resistance and general horizontal networking that assists, for example, in getting telephones to the occupied territories. Partisan operations burn through a lot of phones (each phone has to be destroyed after being used to send coordinates). The phones used tend to be inexpensive ($100) but still need to have basic smartphone functions. Two individuals involved in this process described their sourcing as a grassroots effort, asking trusted friends to help; they said the hardest element was the transient nature of support, which poses strategic challenges for resistance operations, highlighting the need for continuous, reliable assistance to the occupied territories.

SABOTAGE

There have been a significant number of sabotage activities in the occupied territories, many of them psychological as well as physical. For instance, in Melitopol, the resistance movement SROK has engaged in marking the residences of Russian occupiers in the city. Specifically, apartments that Russian military and police personnel have commandeered are marked with “200,” a reference to Cargo 200, the Russian military slang term for dead soldiers. This marking tactic is intended to disrupt the occupiers’ sense of security and destabilize their operations.

The resistance also targets key infrastructure to disrupt Russian logistical and administrative control in the occupied territories. Notably, the railway system in these regions has been declared autonomous and named the “Railways of Novorossiya,” ostensibly to evade international sanctions aimed at Russian Railways. This entity is not integrated into the broader Russian railway network and is overseen by the Federal Agency for Railway Transport (Roszheldor). Strategic efforts by Ukrainian partisans have focused on sabotaging these rail lines, which are critical for transporting military supplies and looted goods, such as grain and metal, from Crimea to mainland Ukraine. On October 13, 2023, and again on December 15, Melitopol partisans successfully detonated devices on trains that were transporting ammunition, fuel, and stolen resources between Crimea and Dniprorudne. These acts resulted in substantial damage to the railway infrastructure and severely disrupted Russian logistical operations. Following these incidents, Russian forces and administrative personnel intensified security measures and launched extensive searches for the partisans, who have, in this case, evaded capture and remained active.

DIRECT ACTION

During the initial full-scale invasion, in many soon-to-be-occupied cities, territorial defense units swiftly transitioned into partisans operating behind enemy lines. An example of this proactive resistance occurred at the battles for the Antonivskyi Bridge near Kherson, where partisans impeded the occupiers’ movements by barricading roads with concrete blocks and trees. Under intense conditions — lacking ammunition and close mortar fire — the partisan leader orchestrated a strategic retreat, ensuring the safety of his unit. Russian forces possessed comprehensive lists of all members of the territorial defense, including personal details such as names and addresses, meaning they had to flee once they could. In an interview with the author, one soldier who fought in the territorial defense of Melitopol recounted his harrowing experience of escaping surrounded cities, navigating through potentially mined fields, leaving behind injured comrades, and enduring severe frostbite.

In a published story on Kherson, another soldier remembers disguising himself as a homeless person to avoid suspicion. Many of the soldier’s comrades stayed behind until the last minute in order to coordinate with commanders to identify and transmit the locations of enemy equipment and personnel. This intelligence gathering was crucial for directing accurate strikes against Russian military assets, but in many cases cost the soldiers their lives.

As in the cases above, there is often a combination of reconnaissance and direct action. For example, while the ATESH movement mainly appears to provide logistical information, partisan activists also claim to have carried out violent attacks, including killing 30 Russian soldiers in a military hospital and setting off a car-bomb attack in Russian-occupied Kherson. In another blurring of roles, there are also crossovers into occupied territory by Ukrainian special divisions. The Bratstvo Ukrainian special division, for example, has conducted operations in Crimea, while others work in different parts of the occupied territories or provide support. For example, Kraken has provided support to Russian units fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces — like Legion Svobody, the RDK, and Vostok battalion — in raids into Russia, as well as to Ichkerian units; these units fight on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces “for the liberation of their countries from Vladimir Putin’s regime,” in the words of Legion Svobody’s leader.

However, there are also raids into occupied Ukrainian territory, much of which remain secret and classified but a few of which have been made public. One HUR special unit conducted a night raid in the area of Nova Kakhovka on January 23, 2023. The raid was possible thanks to cooperation with local partisans and satellite imagery that identified the exact location of the Russian forward command post, which the reconnaissance forces destroyed with grenade launcher fire. The raid also gave the Ukrainian special forces comprehensive data on the number, composition, and locations of enemy reserves. While the so-called Surovikin line of reinforced defensive lines has made such raids very difficult now, they were very common during the initial months of the invasion; for example, in the village of Shestakove, there was a crossing point where people could come and go between the occupied territories and the gray zone, then pass through into the free territories (e.g., Chuhuiv). This was a space, albeit a very dangerous one, for saboteurs to cross into the occupied territories and collect information from villagers or set traps.

Perhaps the most astonishing of all actions are those direct attacks that involve self-sacrifice — as in the example of Maksym Makhrinov, mentioned at the beginning of this report, who blew himself up and took two Russian soldiers with him. In a similar vein, in December 2023, members of a Ukrainian partisan group called the Crimean Combat Seagulls poisoned and killed 24 Russian soldiers after lacing their vodka with arsenic and strychnine, despite knowing that there was a high risk they would be caught, tortured, and even executed. Similarly, there have been reports from Bakhchysarai, Crimea, of Ukrainian partisans killing Russian soldiers by lacing pies and alcohol with arsenic and rat poison. There have also been reports and claims of mass poisonings of Russian troops elsewhere, from Melitopol to Mariupol. Often, attractive young women are involved in these types of actions, and, in the words of one Ukrainian intelligence operative interviewed by the author: “They are very brave but they don’t live very long afterwards. They disappear into the basements, or if they are lucky some general takes them for a bit [for forced sex].”

As in the cases above, partisans’ direct action is overwhelmingly targeted at Russian military or security forces. The author’s own monitoring of Russian and Ukrainian Telegram channels covering the occupied territories identified over 73 reported deaths of Russian soldiers, police officers, and occupation officials at the hands of partisan movements between December 2023 and January 2024 alone. The true number is likely much higher. Moreover, this figure does not include the vastly more numerous deaths of Russian occupying forces from targeted strikes carried out on the basis of intelligence provided by the underground resistance. For example, in February 2024, a Ukrainian strike on a bakery in the occupied eastern Ukrainian city of Lysychansk killed three Russian occupation officials; in April, Ukraine used Storm Shadow cruise missiles supplied by Britain to target the Luhansk military command base for the Russian army — a severe blow to Russia’s efforts to take more of the region, given the micromanagement of the armed operations there, and something that would not have been possible without the involvement of partisans on the ground.

In addition to Russian occupiers, the resistance also targets those collaborators who actively implement and facilitate the occupation. For example, on April 1, 2024, partisans likely assassinated Valeriy Chaika, who went over to the enemy in 2022 and took on the position of deputy head of the “Center for the Maintenance of Educational Organizations,” in which role he implemented Russia’s indoctrination system for Ukrainian children. On February 10, 2024, partisans appear to have assassinated Oleksandr Hallii in Berdyansk. Before the full-scale war, Hallii was involved in waste processing and selling tobacco products, but afterwards he helped the Russians to expropriate the homes and businesses of Ukrainian residents. Hallii fits a rather typical portrait of collaborators in the occupied territories — but Ukrainian partisans have more egregious traitors in their sights, as with the assassination of Ilya Kiva, a former Ukrainian MP and Russian agent, in Moscow.

Implications and Recommendations

The Risk of Being Caught

“Everyone knew that the police station had become the torture chamber, they wanted you to know. I would cross the street not to walk too close to it.” The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident of the occupied territories. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers run by the FSB function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation. There are legion reports of sexualized torture (e.g., electric shocks attached to genitalia), the removal of fingernails, rape, and mutilation. Any Ukrainian caught helping the Ukrainian Special Operations Forces or undertaking violent resistance is unlikely to live for very long — although, given the conditions in the torture chambers, they may not want to live for very long. There are detailed lists of torture chambers across the occupied territories, the happenings in which deserve far greater media attention but are sadly predictable; they were described in detail in Stanislav Aseyev’s recounting of his time in a DNR torture camp.

The performative terror so characteristic of the Putin regime in Russia has acquired an even grislier turn in the occupied territories, as reflected in the words of this former resident. Across all Russian-occupied towns and cities in Ukraine, torture chambers function in plain sight, as a demonstrative form of intimidation.

In anticipation of resistance activities, the occupying forces frequently deploy disinformation campaigns to distract from their inability to prevent such actions. Often, they attempt to link resistance efforts to Western influences, as seen in fabricated news claiming that the “British Council” was attempting to recruit residents on the western bank of Kherson. According to Russian allegations, British intelligence was using cultural engagements as a cover for espionage activities, collecting data on Russian military deployments and occupier equipment. These accusations escalated following a series of successful strikes by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the region, leading to propaganda that painted all cultural exchanges as intelligence operations.

Russian efforts to dismantle the resistance also include crudely executed schemes aimed at ensnaring partisans. For instance, a Telegram channel named “Volya” threatened to destroy schools in Mariupol, purporting to represent an anarcho-Ukrainian underground movement. This was a calculated provocation designed to identify active and potential members of the resistance, framing them as criminals and miscreants within the Russian-controlled narrative. Speaking to the author, one ATESH commander explained how the FSB try to infiltrate their network:

The Russians constantly try to penetrate our network. The FSB are especially interested in us. We maintain our security by verifying potential agents and putting them through a screening process. We give them a number of tasks to complete and then once the potential agent has completed the tasks we give them something a bit trickier. From the results of the tasks we can evaluate their work and their trustworthiness, which trained people help us to do. We can also evaluate how the agent communicates, whether they are suspicious. Normally FSB agents who want to infiltrate us try to find out about our locations, how exactly our network works, and they try to get into physical contact with representatives of the ATESH movement. This system helps us to screen [them] out.

Some areas are experiencing a spate of resistance activity, such as Luhansk, where the resistance is trying to pick up the slack from exhausted forces in the 31st Brigade attempting to resist Russia’s efforts to “fulfill its strategic aims of reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.” In the words of the commander of the 31st Brigade, responsible for this area, his troops “will keep on fighting, they have no other choice but they are tired of course and the lack of support can be felt on the ground and in their heads.” As the resistance try to help as they can, the occupiers have sought to significantly limit their internet access in order to limit communication between partisans and the Ukrainian Armed Forces, such as by installing wired internet which can only be accessed after identification.

The Importance of Resistance

On D-Day, the allies knew the location of the Nazi defenses thanks to the French resistance. This is just one of the many factors — from the weather to technological advances — that contributed to Operation Overlord’s success. Ukrainian resistance groups have played pivotal roles in similar, albeit smaller, operations, significantly aiding the Ukrainian Armed Forces in liberating villages near Kharkiv and throughout the region. Should Ukraine acquire sufficient weaponry to launch further counteroffensives, the Ukrainian resistance will undoubtedly have its own D-Day.

To date, partisans have been instrumental in collecting and transmitting intelligence about the locations of enemy equipment and personnel, enabling the Ukrainian Armed Forces to execute precise strikes against Russian military assets. They support military operations by providing essential intelligence, engaging in sabotage to disrupt enemy logistics and command structures, and creating favorable conditions for Ukrainian military initiatives. This not only impacts the operational capabilities of the occupiers but also exposes critical weaknesses, such as the inadequacy of Russian air defenses in occupied territories. The attacks on Crimea, in particular, have carried substantial geopolitical weight and have bolstered Ukrainian morale, countering Putin’s narratives of Russian might.

Moreover, the actions of the Ukrainian resistance debunk Russian propaganda claims of a welcoming occupied populace and pose challenging questions for the liberal Russian opposition in exile. While some Russians are supporting the Crimean resistance movements, the stark contrast between the vigorous resistance within Ukraine and the lack of any large-scale significant opposition within Russia itself raises critical questions about the authenticity and effectiveness of anti-war sentiments in Russia. The repressive regime in the occupied territories far exceeds that within Russia’s borders — and it is only getting worse. On the other hand, the need to constantly increase the numbers of Russian national guard, FSB, and other security personnel points to the challenges occupiers face in policing resistance activities in the occupied territories. This ongoing resistance stretches Russian resources thin, diverts attention from frontline engagements to internal security, and exacerbates the challenges of sustaining the occupation, further demoralizing the Russian mobilization effort as the local population remains overtly hostile.

Despite the suffocating weight of the Russian occupation, Ukrainian men and women continue to identify, intimidate, and assassinate Russian occupiers on a daily basis. As a result, Russia does not have full control over the temporarily occupied territories. It is facing a sustained, well-trained, and astute insurrectionist campaign. This continued resilience and resistance to occupation will play an ever more important role in undermining the sustainability of the Russian war effort. The integration of civilians into the resistance efforts, forming underground networks that provide logistical and intelligence support, underscores the comprehensive nature of the Ukrainian fight. It is imperative that the international community recognizes these regions not as lost causes but as active participants in Ukraine’s ongoing war of liberation. The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them. Otherwise, they will develop a flawed understanding of the war and what might be an acceptable, or practical, way to resolve it. It is easier to justify giving up hundreds of thousands of innocent men, women, and children to the arbitrary rule of torturers and executioners if you can pretend that there is no alternative, nobody there is fighting back, and the residents have come around to Russian rule, perhaps even welcomed it. As this report shows, that justification is not true.

The heroic feats of the Ukrainian resistance deserve to be covered — and Western audiences deserve to read about them.

Civil and Policy Recommendations

Supporting the Ukrainian resistance is crucial for those committed to thwarting Russian ambitions in the region. The resistance has demonstrated remarkable resilience and effectiveness under extremely challenging conditions. However, these groups require continued moral and financial support to sustain their efforts. Recognizing and amplifying their struggle in media, government discussions, and public discourse is vital.

In thinking of ways the West can support the Ukrainian resistance, the author asked resistance fighters past and present to offer their own recommendations. It goes without saying that they all asked first and foremost for more military support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces to help liberate their territories. As such, what follows is selection of their answers that specifically related to the resistance movement. The following recommendations outline realistic actions that can be supported by policymakers and the general public to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of Ukrainian resistance efforts.

1. Information and Perception

• Enhancing the visibility of the resistance’s activities is crucial. There needs to be a significant increase in English-language coverage, possibly through translations of comprehensive reports by Ukrainian media and greater sharing of English-language Ukrainian sources such as the National Resistance Centre. Russian opposition publications like Verstka and Important Stories also produce important reports on the resistance.

• One Ukrainian research organization heavily involved in the occupied territories expressed a desire for more support from Russian colleagues in the form of data. For both security and political reasons, such cooperation with Russian anti-war organizations should be mediated through a Western, or neutral, intermediary organization.

• In the words of one ATESH fighter: “We need informational support, so that as many people as possible find out about our struggle. That helps us to recruit new potential agents.”

2. Technological Support

• Ensuring the operational continuity of trusted local media outlets in exile is vital. For instance, during its occupation, the local news site Obrii 1909 in Izyum was able, with the help of Western technical support, to unblock its website and then to disseminate crucial information from journalists within and outside the area, bolstering community spirit during critical times.

• Facilitating reconnaissance activities that lighten the load on partisans is essential. Civilian and open-source intelligence (OSINT) communities play a pivotal role in gathering and disseminating actionable intelligence, and the Ukrainian communities involved in this space would be grateful for more assistance from Western colleagues.

• Innovative technological solutions can aid nonviolent resistance. For example, language learning apps could create mirror sites for the Ukrainian language, serving as a tool for cultural preservation and resistance.

3. General Fundraising

• Public fundraising initiatives like “In the Eyes of Partisans” deserve broad support. Individuals can contribute financially to organizations that supply the resistance with essential equipment like drones and communication devices. Nongovernmental organizations can form partnerships with entities like the National Resistance Centre and the Ukraine Security and Cooperation Centre’s Free Ukraine Fund, which supports the resistance with nonlethal equipment and delivers funding to Ukrainian domestic arms producers.

• In addition to U.S. support already provided, European countries should provide dedicated funding for special divisions, such as Kraken, and the Special Operations Forces, as well as military intelligence, who form and/or support the resistance. This is especially important given that while special divisions carry out targeted and difficult work, they receive less priority in resource allocation from the Ukrainian Armed Forces, impacting their operational capabilities.

4. Intelligence Sharing

• Ukraine’s allies should increase the sharing of satellite imagery to identify coordinates to destroy occupation infrastructure. For example, this could include undermining critical infrastructure used by the occupiers, such as the railway line from Rostov to Dzhankoi, which is crucial for Russian military logistics.

• A number of collaborators are reported to be currently living in the European Union, having escaped the Ukrainian liberation via Russia. Ukraine is currently preparing Interpol requests for their extradition, but European countries should proactively identify these individuals and, if there is legally a case to do so, return them to Ukraine to face justice.

Even small measures, like donating telephones for the resistance or helping to increase public awareness of the resilience of the Ukrainian underground, make a real difference in the desperate conditions of the occupied territories. In the words of one active resistance fighter: “We are grateful to any international and Ukrainian media that bring attention to our activities. It is a great help from their side and an honor for us.” It is important to stress that small acts can have large consequences in these circumstances and that individuals supportive of Ukraine do not feel overwhelmed by the scale of the Russian occupation. After all, Ukrainian partisans continue to believe in their own agency:

Our faith in liberation is the cornerstone of our struggle. Our actions, every single successful act of sabotage brings victory closer and we understand that perfectly. Every one of us imagines victory day in their own way. For some of us, it will be a massive party, for others a huge demonstration with Ukrainian symbols everywhere, for others still an unbelievable sense of relief. And for the rest, we will just quietly remember all our dead comrades.

Jade McGlynn is a research fellow in the War Studies Department at King’s College London.